Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale invasion more than two years ago, Western military support for Ukraine has been plagued by endless delays, restrictions, and half-measures. This underwhelming response has typically been blamed on concerns over possible Russian retaliation and the desire to avoid a wider war. In reality, however, some Western leaders may also be motivated by perceptions of Russian weakness rather than fear of Russian strength.
This was the argument set out by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy last week as he bemoaned the inadequate Western reaction to Russia’s invasion. Speaking to journalists in Kyiv, Zelenskyy said he believes Ukraine’s partners “are afraid of Russia losing the war” because this would lead to “unpredictable geopolitical consequences.”
Zelenskyy’s comments are not entirely new, of course. There have long been suggestions that the West’s hesitant approach to aiding Ukraine reflects worries that a Russian defeat could lead to the fall of the Putin regime. Some have even speculated that the Russian Federation itself would be unlikely to survive, and would instead break up into a number of new states, in a continuation of the process that began in 1991.
It is easy enough to imagine why Western policymakers might be alarmed by the prospect of a new Russian collapse. Indeed, the Western response to the disintegration of the USSR was equally cautious, with US President George H. W. Bush traveling to Ukraine on the eve of the country’s declaration of independence in August 1991 to deliver his infamous “Chicken Kiev speech” warning against “suicidal nationalism.”
President Bush was far from alone in prioritizing geopolitical stability over the statehood aspirations of Ukraine and the USSR’s other captive nations. One year earlier, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had visited Ukraine and offered a similarly skeptical view of the country’s independence struggle. Bush and Thatcher were primarily concerned with the fate of the Soviet Union’s colossal war machine and vast nuclear arsenal. Allowing this to be redistributed among a collection of newly independent states seemed the height of recklessness. So rather than hasten the fall of the Soviet Empire, they sought to prevent or at least manage the process.
自两年多前俄罗斯全面入侵以来，西方对乌克兰的军事支持一直受到无休止的拖延、限制和半途而废的困扰。这种平淡反应通常被归咎于对俄罗斯可能报复的担忧以及避免更大规模战争的愿望。然而，事实上，一些西方领导人可能也是出于看到俄罗斯的虚弱，而不是恐惧俄罗斯的强大。
这是乌克兰总统泽连斯基上周提出的论点，他抱怨西方对俄罗斯入侵的反应不足。泽连斯基在基辅对记者说，他认为乌克兰的合作伙伴“担心俄罗斯输掉战争”，因为这将导致“不可预测的地缘政治后果”。
当然，泽连斯基的言论并不完全是新的。长期以来，一直有人认为，西方对援助乌克兰的犹豫不决反映了对俄罗斯失败可能导致普京政权垮台的担忧。 一些人甚至猜测，俄罗斯联邦本身不太可能存活下来，而是会分裂成多个新国家，延续 1991 年开始的分裂进程。
很容易想象为什么西方决策者会对俄罗斯再次崩溃的前景感到震惊。事实上，西方对苏联解体的反应也同样谨慎，美国总统乔治·布什在 1991 年 8 月乌克兰宣布独立前夕前往乌克兰，发表了臭名昭著的“基辅鸡演讲”，警告不要出现“自杀式民族主义”。
布什总统并非唯一一个将地缘政治稳定置于乌克兰和其他苏联附属国建国愿望之上的人。一年前，英国首相玛格丽特·撒切尔访问了乌克兰，并对该国的独立斗争持同样怀疑态度。布什和撒切尔主要关心的是苏联庞大的战争机器和庞大的核武库的命运。允许这些武器在新独立国家之间重新分配似乎是鲁莽之极。因此，他们不是加速苏联帝国的垮台，而是试图阻止或至少控制这一进程。
